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This paper introduces the economic theory of “ quasi-exclusive territory.”  We consider 
vertical dealings with two upstream firms and four downstream firms that compete in 
two separate markets. Under quasi-exclusive territory, downstream firms are bound to 
pay additional charges when selling goods beyond their territorial areas. We find that 
with  respect  to  the  two-part  tariffs  comprising a  m a r g i nal  price  and  a  fixed  fee, 
quasi-exclusive territory is more beneficial for upstream firms and more harmful for 
consumers  than  conventional  exclusive  territory.  Moreover,  we  note  that 
quasi-exclusive  territory  is  in  practice  in  various  vertical  dealings  and  that  its 
regulation is a difficult task.   
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1.    Introduction 
 
Exclusive territory (hereafter, ET) is one of measures used to enforce vertical restraints. 
By  imposing  ET,  upstream  firms  can  eliminate  the  intrabrand  competition  among 
downstream firms. Many authors have explored the economic theory of ET and have 
shown interesting results (e.g., Mathewson and Winter (1984, 1994), Rey and Tirole 
(1986), Dutta, et al. (1994), Nault and Dexter (1994), Alexander and Reiffen (1995), Rey 
and Stiglitz (1995), Boyd (1996), and Mycielski, et al. (2000)).   
    On the other hand, it is well known that in the US competition policy, ET is practiced 
under  the  rule  of  reason.  The  policy  suggests  that  firms  may  be  prohibited  from 
imposing ET even when it is very beneficial for them to do so.1  Moreover, as Suzuki and 
Nariu (2004) indicated, ET may be rather costly for firms to enforce. Unfortunately, 
theoretical works about ET have not focused extensively on these facts.   
    In this paper, we introduce the economic theory of “ quasi-exclusive territory.”  Let us 
consider that one upstream firm sells intermediate goods to two downstream firms that 
are located in separate markets. Further, we suppose that the upstream firm imposes 
an additional charge on the downstream firms when the latter sell their goods beyond 
their respective markets. 
For example, some automobile dealers in Japan contract with manufactures to pay 
additional  charges  when  selling  automobiles  beyond  their  territorial  areas.2  This 
means  that  while  the  dealers  are  not  prohibited  from  selling  cars  outside  their 
territorial  areas,  they  clearly  face  considerable  difficulty  in  doing  so.  Therefore,  as 
Mishima (1993) indicated, manufactures can obtain an effect that is practically similar 
to that obtained with ET.3  We term this “ quasi-exclusive territory”  (hereafter, QET).4 
Note that it is difficult for antitrust authorities to regulate such vertical control because 
the manufactures insist that the additional charge be included in the expense account 
for maintenance services. 
    We  show  that  QET  is  more  beneficial  for  upstream  firms  and  more  harmful  for 
consumers as compared with conventional ET. The model employed here is based on 
Matsumura (2003). The major difference between Matsumura’ s model and ours is that 
the former considers only one upstream firm and two downstream firms. In contrast, we 
consider  two  upstream  firms  and  four  downstream  firms.5  Our  model,  therefore, 
considers competition at the upstream level. Such settings are perhaps more plausible 
                                                   
1  In the EU and Japan as well, ET is allowed only when it is beneficial for consumers. 
2  See, for example, Song (2003), pp.141－145. 
3  See Mishima (1993), pp. 229－231. 
4  For another example, consider that certain remodeling contractors in Japan have established a 
system wherein customers can get repairs done only from the retail shop where they purchased their 
service. Due to such a system, retailers find it difficulty to get customers living far from their outlets. 
5  Matsumura (2003) uses the circular-city spatial model; on the other hand, we consider two separate 
markets. However, this difference is not significant. In the appendix, we show that Matsumura’ s result 
can also be obtained in our model. Economics Working Paper Archive 
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in the real world.   
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes our model, 
section  3  analyzes  it,  section  4  concludes  our  results,  and  the  appendix  presents 
Matsumura’ s result obtained using our model. 
 
2.    The Model 
 
We consider two upstream firms (firms A and B) and four downstream firms (firms 1, 2, 
3, and 4). Let us assume that firm A sells intermediate goods to firms 1 and 2 and that 
firm B sells to firms 3 and 4. We consider two separate markets (markets 1 and 2); firms 
1 and 3 are located in market 1, and firms 2 and 4 are located in market 2. Firms A and 
B impose a two-part tariff on each downstream firm. Thus if a downstream firm buys a 
quantity  Q ,  it  must  pay  Qw F  ,  where  F   is  the  franchise  fee  and  w   is  the 
wholesale price. We suppose a constant marginal production cost for firms A and B and 
normalize it to zero. Therefore, since each upstream firm has two down stream firms, 
the profit of each upstream firm is  Qw F  2 , when selling quantity  Q. These settings 
are the same as those of Matsumura (2003). 
  T h e  downstream firms must purchase one intermediate good to produce one final 
good and they compete in the Cournot fashion in markets 1 and 2. We assume a linear 
demand  function    q a Q P     where  a   is  a  positive  constant  and  q   is  the  total 
sales at the market, which is the same in both markets. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that the production cost of the downstream firms only comprises the payment 
made to the upstream firm. Furthermore, we assume that the final goods produced by 
the downstream firms are homogeneous.   
    The game which we consider proceeds as follows. In the first stage, the upstream 
firms  determine  their  wholesale  price;  in  the  second  stage,  the  upstream  firms 
determine their franchise fee; and in the third stage, the downstream firms compete in 
the Cournot fashion in each market. 
 
3.    Analysis 
 
3.1. Exclusive territory 
 
First, we consider conventional ET. In this case, firms 1 and 3 sell their final goods only 
in  market  1  and  firms  2  and  4  sell  only  in  market  2.  Each  upstream  firm’ s  profit 








3     ,  where  i w   is  the 
wholesale price imposed by firm  i , 
j
i q is the quantity sold to the downstream firm  i  Economics Working Paper Archive 
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in  market  j ,  i F   is  the  franchise  fee  imposed  by  firm  i ,  and  the  superscripts 
(subscripts) of the variables indicate the markets (firms).   
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Following Matsumura (2003), we consider that firm A (firm B) chooses such  A F   ( B F ) 
that  0 2 1      ( 0 4 3     ).6  Therefore, we get 
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D i fferentiating (5) with respect to  i w , we have 




i          , , ,     ,  
4 4
.                   ( 6 )  
( 6 ) suggests that an increase in the wholesale price leads to a decrease in the rival€31 s 
wholesale price. The logic is as follows: a rise in the wholesale price decreases the sales 
                                                   
6  We assume that firms 1 and 2 (firms 3 and 4) can contract only with firm A (firm B). Economics Working Paper Archive 
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of the corresponding downstream firms, and the rival downstream firms, which compete 
in the Cournot fashion, attempt to increase their sales. Therefore, an increase in the 
wholesale price leads to a decrease in the rival’ s wholesale price.7   
Then, from (6), we obtain the optimal wholesale price: 
5
a
w w B A    .                                ( 7 )  
( 7 )   s u ggests that upstream firms set the wholesale price lower than the production costs. 
Although this may appear strange, in our model, the upstream firms can completely 
siphon off the profits of the downstream firms.8  Therefore, the optimal strategy is for 
upstream firms to allow downstream firms to sell more final goods and subsequently 
extract the profits by imposing a franchise fee.   
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3 . 2 .   Q u a si-exclusive territory 
 
Next,  we  consider  that  the  four  downstream  firms  face  Cournot  competition  with 
quasi-exclusive territory. Under QET, downstream firms are not prohibited from selling 
beyond  their  markets.  By p aying  an  additional  charge  “ t ,”   downstream  firms  are 
allowed to sell beyond their markets.9  Thus, the two upstream firms’  profits are 
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3        
and the four downstream firms’  profits are 
  2 , 1     ,   ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1        i for F q t w P q w P A i A i A i   
  4 , 3     ,   ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1        j for F q t w P q w P B j B j B j  . 
As a result of Cournot competition, the outputs of firms 1 and 2 are 
  j i and j i for
t w w a
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.    (10) 
                                                   
7  That is, the upstream firm’ s competition emerges only in the downstream firms’  Cournot 
competition. 
8  In an upstream monopoly case such as Matsumura (2003), the optimal wholesale price with 
exclusive territory is zero, as seen in the appendix. 
9  In our model, no one obtains  t. It is true that if upstream firms can obtain  t, they gain more; 
however, the main results in this paper do not vary with internalization of  t. Economics Working Paper Archive 
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Since we assume a symmetric economy, the outputs of firms 3 and 4 are obtained in the 
same manner. Thus, the price of the final goods and the downstream firms’  profits are 
obtained as a function of the wholesale prices and franchise fees: 
5
2 2 2 2 1 t w w a
P P
B A   
                           ( 11) 
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Upstream  firms  decide  such  A F  ( B F )  t h at  0 2 1     ( 0 4 3    ) .  Therefore, 
we have 
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Then, the profits of each upstream firm are 
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Differentiating (15) with respect to  i w , we have 
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Therefore we obtain 
28
2 t a
w w B A
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  .                             ( 17) 








1     q q q q .  (17) 
suggests that the wholesale price is rising with  t . This is because a rise in  t   can soften 
competition.10   
Furthermore, substituting (17) into (11) and (15), we obtain 
                                                   
10  Such a competition-reducing effect is not seen in Matsumura (2003) since there is no competition at 
the upstream level in his model. 
. Economics Working Paper Archive 
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3.3. Exclusive territory vs. quasi-exclusive territory 
 
Let us present the main results. First, we compare the price of the final goods under 






Q E    .                            ( 20) 
From (20), we find that the sign of 
Q E P P    depends on  t . Figure 1 indicates this 
relationship. Perhaps surprisingly, when  15 2a t  , QET fetches a higher price than 
ET although it is more competitive than ET. Therefore, consumers suffer larger losses 
under QET than under ET.   
  T h e logic is as follows. QET provides greater competition-enhancing effects than ET; 
therefore, the price under Cournot competition by the four downstream firms in each 
market is lower than that under ET, provided that  t   is sufficiently small. However, a 
large  t   offsets  the  competition-enhancing  effects  on  price. 11   Consequently,  the 
effective QET leads to a higher price. 
Next, we compare the upstream firms’  profits under QET with those under ET. From 
(9) and (19), we obtain 
2450
2525 12 92
2 2 t at a Q E  
    .                     ( 21) 
(21) suggests that 
Q E      is realized only when  a t 26 . 0 0   . Therefore, upstream 
firms can extract more profits by conducting effective QET.12 
  F i g u res 1 and 2 show the relationship between  t   and the profits of the upstream 
firms.  This  result correlates with that of Lahiri and Ono (1988). They showed that 
domestic welfare was improved by reducing the outputs of rather inferior firms. Clearly, 
an increase in  t   leads to such effects. Therefore, it is beneficial for upstream firms to 
impose  t . 
  W h y  d o e s  QET have more profit-enhancing effects than ET? From (7) and (17), we 
know that the wholesale price under QET is higher than that under ET. This is because 
                                                   
11  Such a competition-enhancing effect is not seen in Matsumura (2003) since his model does not 
include competition at the upstream level. 
12  If the upstream firm is a monopolist, both consumer and producer surplus benefit from ET as long 
as  0  t . See appendix and Matsumura (2003). Economics Working Paper Archive 
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the upstream firms prefer to avoid selling large quantities at the downstream level. In 
comparison with ET, the Cournot competition among the four downstream firms in each 
market is very competitive for the upstream firms.   
However,  by  imposing  t ,  the  upstream  firms  can  soften  the  competition  while 
maintaining a high wholesale price. Therefore, QET is more beneficial for upstream 
firms than conventional ET. 
 
4.    Concluding remarks 
 
It is a well-known fact that ET may be beneficial for both producers and consumers 
because it may reform the distribution system or enhance the effect of advertising. QET 
also displays such effects. However, we have shown in this paper that QET is more 
beneficial  for  producers  and  more  harmful  for  consumers  as  compared  with  ET. 
Therefore, ET and not QET should be used in terms of consumer surplus.   
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, it may be difficult for the antitrust 
authorities to take action in the case of QET. However, we can state that the authorities 
should  take  action  against  producers  if  they  impose  upon  retailers  obviously 
unnecessary additional charges in lieu of permission to sell beyond their markets. Such 




Matsumura (2003) argues that ET may enhance both consumer and producer surplus. 
In this appendix, we discuss the case of Matsumura (2003), i.e., there is one upstream 
firm ( f i rm A )  a n d  t w o  d o w n s t r e a m  firms ( f i rms  1  and  2).  The u p s t r e a m  f i r m  i s  a 
monopolist  and  sells  intermediate  goods  to  both  the  downstream  firms.  The  other 
assumptions and notations are the same as those in the text.   
First, we consider that the upstream firm imposes ET: firm 1 sells only in market 1 
and firm 2 sells only in market 2. Therefore, each downstream firm is a monopolist in its 
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Firm A chooses the franchise fee and wholesale price. The profit of firm A is Economics Working Paper Archive 
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    .                     ( A - 4 )  
F r o m   t h e   f i r s t   o r d e r   c o n d i t i o n   o f   (A-4), we obtain 
0  A w .                                ( A - 5 )  
(A-5) shows that firm A  does not impose a wholesale price in order to avoid double 
marginalization; it then extracts monopoly profit through the franchise fee. This result 
is the same as that of Matsumura (2003). 
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Next, I consider the case of Cournot competition, i.e., firms 1 and 2 sell final goods in 
both markets and each downstream firm pays additional charges (or transportation 
cost)  t   in order to access another market. Consequently, the profits of firms 1 and 2 in 
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From (A-9) and (A-10), we get Economics Working Paper Archive 
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From the first order condition of (A-11), we obtain 
8 4
t a
wA   .                              (A-12) 
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.                     (A-14) 
Finally, we compare the results under ET with those under Cournot competition. 






E C .                          (A-15) 
(A-15) suggests that the price under ET is lower than the Cournot price, if and only if 










     
t
a
t C E .                     (A-16) 
From (A-16), we find that 
C E      as long as  0  t . These results suggest that when 
the upstream firm is a monopolist, both consumer and producer surplus benefit from ET 
as long as  0  t . This is quite consistent with the result of Matsumura (2003), who 
considered  a  circular-city  spatial  model.  For  the  logic  of  this  appendix,  refer  to 
Matsumura (2003). 
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